The Ethiopian Balance-Sheet of Transformation
Following is the total sum of the transformation success which is so much acclaimed and being declared to be a miracle accomplished by the late PM Melesse Zenawi these days. – Highly proclaimed and so shamefully state financed and orchestrated by the Ethiopian regime through the Public Mourning taking place during the last 15 days all over the country. The preparation took place almost 75 days since the actual date presumed to be the death of the Prime minister. A Ceremony which would be accomplished on Sunday, the 2nd September of 2012 almost outsmarting the North Korean Model of Mourning !..
“Despite remarkable GDP growth rates (7% – 9% per year), some 5 million to 6 million people were again in need of food aid. Assistance came from the World Bank, IMF (Exogenous Shocks Facility), the European Union, the United States and China. In total, Ethiopia received almost $1.8 billion in development aid and loans in 2009, bringing the total sum received since 1991 to just under $26 billion.” BTI 2012-Report
BTI 2012 Report
“This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2012. The BTI is a global assessment of transition processes in which the state of democracy and market economy as well as the quality of political management in 128 transformation and developing countries are evaluated.”
Scale: 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) – score & rank
I. Status Index (1-10)
Rank Nr. 109 out of 128
II. Political Transformation (1-10)
Rank Nr. 105 out of 128
III. Economic Transformation (1-10)
Rank Nr. 111 out of 128
IV. Mangement Index (1-10)
Rank 107 out of 128
Ethiopia’s political performance in 2009 and 2010 was characterized by contradiction within the government’s politics: While the government under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi successfully launched economic reforms aimed at stimulating economic growth and economic diversification, it brought the country’s democratization process nearly to a halt. The bitter results of the 2005 and 2010 elections, indirectly manipulated by the government, and the subsequent authoritarian backlash have frustrated nearly all relevant political actors outside the government camp. Opposition parties have been undermined to the extent that they no longer pose a threat; the media and civil society have been leashed by oppressive laws; and trade unions and professional associations have been forced either to toe the line or, like the Teacher’s Union, be dissolved.
The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of five political parties under the leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), is expected to remain firmly in control at all levels of government following its emphatic “victory” in the May 2010 parliamentary election, which did not receive the label “free and fair” from the EU Electoral Observation Mission. The EPRDF and its allied parties gained a 99% majority in Ethiopia’s parliament, the House of People’s Representatives, with opposition candidates winning just two seats. The EPRDF won 499 out of 544 seats and the Somali People’s Democratic Party 24 seats, while the three opposition parties together won only two seats, down from 161 five years before. It is widely believed that the scale of the victory resulted from harassment of political opponents and the memory of the violent crackdown on post-election violence in 2005, as well as the passage of restrictive laws governing the media, civil society and political funding.
What happened in Ethiopia after 2005 comes close to a process of politically engineered democratic regression: Although the constitution of 1995 was applauded for its commitment to liberal democracy and respect for political freedoms and human rights, the EPRDF regime
refused to accept democratic rules of the game as a part of its political practice. While promising democracy, the government has not accepted that the legal opposition is qualified to take power via the ballot box. It tends to regard the expression of different views and interests as a form of betrayal. When the EPRDF felt threatened by the opposition’s unexpected victory winning all council seats in the capital in 2005, its brutal crackdown against the opposition demonstrated the extent to which the regime is willing to ignore popular protest and foreign criticism in the interest of holding to power.
The government’s behavior in the aftermath of the May 2005 elections raised fundamental questions about the legitimacy of its rule. The human and political rights situation has worsened significantly since the balloting was held. An official parliamentary report on post-election violence in 2006 documented 30,000 arrests, 199 deaths resulting in most cases from gunfire, and the use of “excessive force” on the part of the government.
The international community has widely ignored or downplayed these political problems. Some donors appear to consider food security more important than democracy in Ethiopia, but they neglect the increased ethnic awareness and tensions created by the regionalization policy and the potentially explosive consequences.
Instability in the volatile Horn of Africa has tended to cement Ethiopia’s position as the United States’ key ally in the region, while strained relations with Eritrea and the failing Somali state will continue to dominate the foreign policy agenda. The protracted border dispute with Eritrea remains at a dangerous impasse.
In 2009, Ethiopia withdrew all of its military forces from Somalia after two years seeking to assist Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in its struggle against Islamist rebels, the Islamic Courts Union. On the Eritrea-Ethiopian border issue, the ideological and judicial stalemate continued: No talks were held and the U.N Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) withdrew its cooperation.
On the level of socioeconomic development, the country has taken steps toward market-based reforms, such as trade regulation and an “agricultural development-led industrialization.” In the last five years, GDP growth has attained remarkable rates of 7% to 9% per year. The country remains heavily dependent on the performance of the dominant agricultural sector, with coffee and “chat” as the main cash crops. Economic diversification has been hampered by the reluctance of the government to accept land privatization or allow activity by foreign banks. But the government has recently shown new flexibility toward trade liberalization.
The country still has a huge trade imbalance (imports of $7.21 billion compared to exports of $1.56 for the year 2008), and a current-account deficit of 4% of GDP. The threat of famine rose again as a serious problem for Ethiopia in 2008 – 2009.
Despite remarkable GDP growth rates (7% – 9% per year), some 5 million to 6 million people were again in need of food aid. Assistance came from the World Bank, IMF (Exogenous Shocks Facility), the European Union, the United States and China. In total, Ethiopia received almost$1.8 billion in development aid and loans in 2009, bringing the total sum received since 1991 to just under $26 billion.
Relations with China strengthened during the period under review, and were dominated by the economic interests and resource acquisitions of China. Trade between the two nations rose substantially again, reportedly reached a value of $1.376 billion. China’s post-Communist, state-capitalist model and its dominant-party governance system continued to appeal to Ethiopian leaders.
(our bold & emphasis)
More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org
Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 — Ethiopia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012.
© 2012 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh